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RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITU· 
TIONAL LA w. By Mark Tushnet. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 1988. Pp. x, 328. $35. 
I wish I was on some 
Australian mountain range 
I got no reason to be there, but I 
Imagine it would be some kind of change1 
Mark Tushnet's new book is an example of how too many layers of 
theoretical detachment can obscure truly innovative scholarship. His 
fervent insistence that he can do no more than deconstruct existing 
constitutional jurisprudence detracts from the significant positive con-
tributions of Red, White, and Blue. One purpose of this review is thus 
to rescue Tushnet from himself, and his optimism from his nihilism. 
The fundamental thesis of Red, White, and Blue is that the liberal 
tradition, dominant in American political life, makes a theory of judi-
cial review both necessary and impossible. This conclusion might be 
trite were it not for the undercurrents of neorepublicanism that sweep 
Tushnet's arguments and transform his avowed pure criticism into 
something constructive (heaven forfend!). Unfortunately, the republi-
can undercurrents do remain largely below the surface, overshadowed 
by thoroughly familiar criticism of contemporary theories of constitu-
tional interpretation. 
The most recent battle over constitutional interpretation has been 
raging for well over a decade,2 and it has been clear for quite some 
time that the best minds of a generation have been unable to describe a 
unified theory of constitutional interpretation that constrains both 
judges and legislators. Too much is indeterminate: if grand theory is 
all we have to protect us, we seem doomed to suffer under either legis-
lative or judicial tyranny. 
What Tushnet adds to this familiar litany is the recognition that 
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. A.B. 1976, Middlebury College; J.D. 1979, 
University of Chicago. - Ed. I am grateful to Paul H. Edelman, Daniel A. Farber, and Philip P. 
Frickey for their comments on earlier drafts of this review. 
1. Bob Dylan, Outlaw Blues,© 1965 Columbia Records. 
2. Indeed, some of Tushnet's own earlier contributions to that battle are reworked in Red, 
White, and Blue. For example, the first chapter is a newer version of Following the Rules Laid 
Down: A Critique of lnterpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983); the 
second chapter is a modified version of Darkness on the Edge of Town:. The Contributions of John 
Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980). 
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the liberal tradition's dilemma is caused in major part by the decline of 
its once coequal partner, the American tradition of civic republican-
ism. Thus Tushnet - despite his disclaimer that the republican tradi-
tion cannot be revived - offers hope for those of us engaged in 
constitutional scholarship. Once we have grasped the fundamental 
notion that the liberal tradition cannot flourish in the absence of re-
publicanism, we may begin constructing a modem version of the re-
publican tradition that fills the gaps iii. our. liberal constitution. 
I 
Tushnet devotes almost two thirds of the book to offeriitg critiques 
of the current grand theories of judicial review. This should come as 
no surprise: Tushnet once described himself as a member of. "the 
party in opposition to what exists,"3 ·and he closes Red, White, and 
Blue by proclaiming that "[c]ritique is aii there is;·, {p. 318). 
' .. 
Each of the five chapters in Part One, ("The Critique of Grand 
Theory") is devoted to a careful examination of one or more of the 
currently popular grand theories of constitutional law. In each case, 
Tushnet deconstructs the grand theory in the best critical tradition. 
He shows how its precepts would allow judges to reach virtually any 
result, and how any version of the theory that truly constrained judi-
cial discretion would leave legislators completely unconstrained. Its 
indeterminacy thus exposed, the theory is discarded. His is an equal 
opportunity dismissal: he rejects textualism, originalism, and neutral 
principles in chapter 1; representation-reinforcing review in chapter 2; 
abstract moral philosophy and community values in chapter 3; and 
practical reason and neotraditionalism in chapter 4. . 
Tushnet is very good at this form of deconstruction. His attack on 
the refined version of originalism - which incorporates a hermeneuti-
cal approach to history - was a masterpiece when it was originally 
written in 1983, and it remains worth repeating. He crafts a superb 
hermeneutical argument that Brown v. Board of Education reflects the 
original intent of the framers of the fourteenth amendment if one ar-
gues that education today plays the role that freedom of contract did 
in the mid-nineteenth century {pp. 41-42). Having persuaded the 
reader of the plausibility of the analogy, however, he then shows that 
the equivalence between education and contract is "only one of a great 
many possible reconstructions of that segment of the past" {p. 43). He 
thus successfully shows that this version of originalism cannot con-
strain judges. 
The more refined version of neutral principles - which he calls 
"craft interpretation" - fares no better. "Craft interpretation," on 
his definition, depends on the existence of shared professional stan-
3. Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEXAS L. REv. 1363, 1398 (1984). 
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dards that guide judges in their determinations. Judging is thus a 
learned craft that incorporates widely shared values, neutral princi-
ples, and legitimate techniques of argument, all of which serve as a 
constraint on discretion. Tushnet argues that such a description does 
not tell us anything except that "skillful judges can do things, and can 
survive professional criticism, that less skillful ones cannot" (p. 53), 
and points out that there is "a cottage industry of constitutional law 
scholars who write revised opinions for controversial decisions" (pp. 
53-54). 
Further, he rejects outright the argument that neutral principles -
in any version - can at least rule out some answers, by suggesting 
worlds in which apparently bizarre answers are acceptable.4 In short, 
here as elsewhere in the book, Tushnet argues that constitutional the-
ory necessarily depends on the existence of a community of interpret-
ers - a community that, in the absence of a vibrant republican 
tradition, cannot exist. I will return later to this question, for it lies at 
the heart of Tushnet's thesis that a theory of judicial review is neces-
sary only where it is impossible and possible only where it is 
unnecessary. 
The other contemporary grand theories fail under the same type of 
analysis. Ely's representation-reinforcing review, for example, foun-
ders on the problem of whether the adequacy of representation is mea-
sured in terms of formal (e.g., voting) or informal (access to power) 
mechanisms: "If representation consists in formal mechanisms, the 
theory appears to be inadequate to guard against tyranny by a con-
gressional majority; but if representation occurs through informal 
mechanisms as well, the theory loses its force as a guard against tyr-
anny by the judiciary" (p. 75). In particular, it is difficult to deter-
mine, without giving judges unlimited discretion, whether any given 
outcome "results· from obstacles to representation rather than from 
lack of sufficiently intense concern on the part of those affected" (p. 
80). 
Tushnet seems particularly outraged by the suggestion that judges 
should decide cases on the basis of abstract moral norms, or natural 
law. Assuming that there are such norms, he argues that (1) they are 
socially and historically contingent, (2) important moral decisions 
4. His particular example is the multiple choice question "Which pair of numbers comes next 
in the series 1, 3, 5, 7 ... ?" P. 55. He notes that Fred Schauer suggested some "clearly incor-
rect'' answers, such as "9, 11, 13" or "Cleveland, Newark." Tushnet then defends these two 
answers: 
[T]he test taker could reasonably think that the inclusion of ["Cleveland, Newark"] demon-
strates that the test giver is a numerologist and would then convert the suggested answers to 
the corresponding number and develop an appropriate mathematical rule ..•. Or [the test 
taker could conclude that] •.• the test giver likes to play with words, notices that pair 
sounds Iikepear, and thinks that, as the numbers appear on a page, "9, 11, 13" looks like a 
pear. 
P. 55 n.106. For a critique of Tushnet's arguments, see infra text accompanying notes 22-27. 
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ought to be made individually and contextually while judicial review 
must proceed by following rules, (3) judges ate no better than legisla-
tors at divining moral truth, and (4) imposing only some moral norms 
on a thoroughly immoral society might do more harm than good. 5 
His overall critique here seems too simplistic, largely because he ne-
glects the effects of federalism. He may be right that state judges and 
state legislators are roughly equal in both the contingency of their be-
liefs and the clarity of their moral vision, especially since many state 
judges are elected. The selection process and life tenure for federal 
judges, however, may yield federal judges who are better able than 
either their state judicial counterparts or their federal legislative com-
patriots to perceive and implement broad moral norms. Moreover, 
where federal courts invalidate state statutes or state and federal non-
legislative acts, there is an even stronger argument to be made for the 
superiority of judges in applying broader moral norms more stead-
fastly than do those whose actions they review. 6 
Despite these lapses, Tushnet is generally convincing in his attacks 
on each of the contemporary grand theories of judicial review. He 
persuasively argues that there can be no unified theory of interpreta-
tion that will absolutely constrain judges and still safeguard constitu- · 
tional limits on legislative power. Whether such absolute guarantees 
are necessary in order to defend judicial review as it is currently prac-
ticed is another question, to which I shall return later. 
Ultimately, however, Tushnet's deconstructive critique is repetitive 
and largely uninformative. It is repetitive in part because of its famili-
arity. Since at least 1980, when John Ely's Democracy and Distrust 
was published, we have been inundated with books and articles both 
proclaiming and discrediting every possible grand theory. Neutral 
principles and its critics go back to the 1950s, and criticism of natural 
law goes back at least as far as the beginning of this century. 
Indeed, the debate in its various forms can be traced to the begin-
ning of the republic itself. The purpose of Justice Story's rules for 
constitutional interpretation, writes historian G. Edward White, was 
neither to promote uniformity in constitutional adjudication nor to avoid 
"embarrassments" in construction, but to maintain an image of judges as 
being bound by professional conventions while at the same time afford-
ing judicial interpreters of the Constitution as much freedom as possible 
to draw on a range of extraconstitutional sources in the interpretation of 
5. Pp. 108-23. Tushnet turns at this point to a more 'contextual "community values" theory, 
which I will discuss later. The subsequent two chapters, which focus on practical reason and 
"little theories," respectively, will also be discussed later, as they too involve a critique of 
"communities." 
6. The classic elaboration of the judicial capacity for taking the long view, of course, is A. 
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). For an interesting recent defense of federal 
judicial superiority in the context of the debate over the "parity" of the state and federal courts, 
see Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A Comment on Federal 
Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 UCLA L. REV. 329 (1988). 
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the constitutional text. 1 
Although White has the advantage of hindsight, the indeterminacy of 
the Supreme Court's rules for constitutional adjudication were equally 
transparent to Story's contemporaries. Thomas Jefferson wrote of 
John Marshall in 1810, "In [his] hands ... the law is nothing more 
than an ambiguous text, to be explained by his sophistry into any 
meaning which may subserve his personal malice."8 It is not news 
that those who practice and defend judicial review maintain that it can 
be constrained in a meaningful way, nor that the constraints are per-
ceived as (and often are) illusory. 
Tushnet's basic critique of contemporary theory is also uninforma-
tive because even if it were wholly novel, it would not teach us much. 
As Paul Brest has pointed out, most critiques of constitutional theory 
are "rather like an aesthetic judgment issued from the Warsaw Palace 
of Culture": "Why is the best view of Warsaw from the Palace of 
Culture? ... Because that's the only place in Warsaw where you can't 
see the Palace of Culture."9 No theory is immune from critique, in-
cluding Tushnet's own. Tushnet suggests, for example, that all grand 
theories betray their political agendas by code words: 
If one sees the key words "process values," for example, one knows that 
we are about to learn that the Constitution requires the implementation 
of the platform of the 1964 Democratic Party, and if one sees "equal 
concern and respect," one knows that we are about to learn that the 
Constitution requires the implementation of the 1972 Democratic 
platform. 11? 
He might have added that if one sees the key words "critical analysis" 
one is likely to get some version of the SDS Port Huron Statement. So 
what?11 
7. 34 G. WHITE, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-35, 
at 117 (1988). 
8. Jefferson to John Tyler, May 26, 1810, in 9 THE WRmNGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 276 
n.l (P. Ford ed. 1898). See also 2 N. SCHACHNER, THOMAS JEFFERSON: A BIOGRAPHY 898 
(1951). 
9. Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative 
Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1096 & n.189 (1981). 
10. P. 3. See also p. 144 n.125: "Another objection is that [Michael] Perry's religious vision 
is so conventional - everYthing converges on the left-liberal wing of the Democratic Party. It 
would be engaging to find out that God wants us to be vegetarians, or to disarm unilaterally, or 
to fire a preemptive nuclear first strike." Tushnet, too, is conventional. Except for an apparent 
flirtation with theocracy (see infra notes 13-16 and accompanying text), he advocates only posi-
tions taken by the radical left. 
11. It is only fair to note that Tushnet does not claim to be producing recommendations 
either for courts or for those whose work is designed to influence the courts. Thus the fact that 
he is subject to his own criticisms is somewhat irrelevant; only those who claim to be making 
bounded, principled arguments - and not those arguing for radical societal changes - are truly 
harmed by deconstruction of their arguments. One is still left, however, with the rather puzzling 
question of who Tushnet is writing for: Those likely to force the sorts of radical changes he urges 
are not likely to be reading Red, White, and Blue. 
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After this negative excursion into theory, the last three chapters of 
the book extend the deconstructive project back to constitutional doc-
trine itself. Tushnet describes his own purpose as an attempt to "de-
velop the [Legal Realist view] by examining the processes by which 
power operates to shape our understanding of the social world" (p. 
213). Here the critical analysis is more directed and less familiar. For 
that reason, it makes very interesting reading, but it is nonetheless 
puzzling in its apparent purposelessness. 
Tushnet explores three separate substantive areas. Chapter 7 
("The Constitution of the Bureaucratic State") deals with procedural 
due process; chapter 8 ("The Constitution of Religion") discusses reli-
gious liberty; and chapter 9 ("The Constitution of the Market") covers 
commercial speech, campaign finance limitations, and pornography. 
In each case, he suggests that a particular - and incomplete - under-
lying vision of the world animates Supreme Court doctrine. As he 
puts it, "[t]he Court has ... developed a constitutional law for an 
imaginary society and has sought to persuade us that the imaginary 
world is our own" (p. 240). 
This "imaginary" world is the liberal world in which rationality is 
king. Tushnet is more or less successful in suggesting that a commit-
ment to the primacy of the rational faculty underlies Supreme Court 
doctrine in each of the three areas. He is rather less successful in 
showing how such a world is imaginary, or in sketching a more "real-
istic" picture of the world. Moreover, he exhibits most clearly in these 
chapters his paradoxical combination of intellectual nihilism and so-
cial utopianism. 
He shows quite convincingly that the Supreme Court's procedural 
due process cases reward and protect "rationalized," "professional-
ized" bureaucracies: those bureaucracies that have developed pur-
portedly neutral, nonpolitical rules and norms. The most striking 
example he cites - roadblocks and other forms of police stops - is 
not within the traditional notion of procedural due process, but the 
analytic framework is analogous. He notes that the Court's rulings on 
such stops have exhibited a marked preference for, and deference to, 
department-generated rules that deny discretion to officers on the 
streets. This shows, Tushnet suggests, that "the Court sees hierarchi-
cal control within the police agency as an alternative to hierarchical 
control by an external agency, the courts," and "reinforces the argu-
ment that the Court envisions self-contained bureaucracies governed 
by internal rules and internalized professionalized norms" (p. 223). 
The same can be said, he argues, of such diverse bureaucracies as wel-
fare agencies, universities, and prisons. 
The liberal tradition's commitment to the rational capacity is also 
apparent in the Court's protection of commercial speech and cam-
paign financing. According to Tushnet, liberals believe "that the citi-
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zenry has sufficient rational evaluative capacities to accept or reject 
political and commercial claims on whatever the merits might be" (p. 
279). Thus the Court strikes down - and the liberal tradition has 
difficulty defending - many attempts to interfere with the evaluative 
process by regulation. These attempts fail because they are motivated 
or justified by the discredited republican willingness to value 
noncognitive or nonrational thought as well as rational thought. The 
liberal privileging of instrumental rationality deprives would-be regu-
lators of the underpinning for their arguments. 
Tushnet's deconstruction of the debate over pornography is espe-
cially interesting, largely because both sides are vulnerable to his re-
publican-based critique. Tushnet suggests that the radical feminist 
challenge to pornography rests primarily on noncognitive argu-
ments.12 ·By constantly manipulating the harm (varying from rape to 
social subordination) and the cause (varying from violent pornography 
to nonsexual depictions of women's subordination to nonviolent ex-
plicit sex), and by relying more on anecdotal evidence than on hard 
data, the radical feminist attack rhetorically evokes sympathy but 
"[does] not meet the usual standards applied when one appeals to cog-
nitive deliberation" (p. 298). Moreover, Tushnet correctly identifies 
the radical feminists' fundamental complaint about pornography: por-
nography is itself "an argument for male domination of women that 
works by means of its appeal to men's noncognitive deliberative capac-
ities" (p. 304; footnote omitted). 
Ultimately, however, the radical feminist appeal to noncognitive 
capacities creates a paradox, as Tushnet recognizes. If noncognitive 
capacities are an important method of deliberation and decisionmak-
ing - as the radical feminists suggest - then pornography should 
remain unregulated, because it is "itself an argument, appealing to 
noncognitive capacities, for a particular arrangement of power in soci-
12. Pp. 293-301. In the process, Tushnet devastates the radical feminists' so-called "empiri-
cal" evidence: 
Social scientists would draw no conclusions about the connection between pornography and 
rape from evidence that a large proportion of rapists possessed pornography; they would 
need to know what proportion of nonrapists possessed it too, for if nonrapists possessed it 
about as often as rapists did, social scientists would not infer a causal connection ••.• Even 
evidence that all rapists possessed pornography might not be probative of a connection be-
tween pornography and rape, if, as some proponents of regulation argue, pornography is so 
pervasive that virtually all men possess it. 
P. 298 & n.68. One could make an even sharper statement: Even if all rapists and no nonrapists 
possessed pornography, that would not show that pornography is a cause of rape. It is equally 
likely that some other, not-yet-known fact causes both a tendency toward rape and a taste for 
pornography. I am indebted to Steven Penrod for this insight. 
Tushnet goes on to refute the radical feminist reliance on psychological studies: 
Finally, a series of well-known psychological studies establishes some connection between 
some sorts of violent sexual material and attitudes supporting women's subordination •••. 
The material used in those studies was not obviously pornographic, if pornography requires 
sexually explicit depictions, and the material is causally connected not to violence but to 
attitudes linked to women's subordination. 
P. 298. 
May 1989) Outlaw Blues 1425 
ety" (p. 305). Indeed, Tushnet's description of the paradox captures 
the central argument in the Seventh Circuit's invalidation of the Indi-
anapolis anti-pornography ordinance. Judge Easterbrook, writing for 
the court, "accept[ed] the [empirical] premises of [the] legislation" 
that pornography causes attitude changes, but noted that "this simply 
demonstrates the power of pornography as speech."13 Although 
Tushnet appears to believe that at least some kinds of pornography 
ought to be regulated, 14 he never explains how the paradox ought to be 
resolved. 
Chapter Eight, on religious liberty, is perhaps the most interesting 
and innovative part of the book. In some ways, it is also the most 
troubling. Tushnet argues that the liberal tradition, lacking the 
"nonindividualist values" of a republican heritage, is incapable of deal-
ing satisfactorily with problems involving religion. In the republican 
tradition, religious activities are both an important communal experi-
ence and an influence on individual values. The liberal tradition, on 
the other hand, because it is individualist and because it assumes that 
individual preferences are exogenously formed, is fundamentally in-
compatible with religion and thus "relegat[es] it to the sphere of pri-
vate life" (p. 271). 
Tushnet's theoretical and doctrinal talents shine in this chapter. 
He canvasses both Free Exercise and ;Establishment Clause cases to 
show how current doctrine marginalizes religion and makes it irrele-
vant in public life; current doctrine "rest[ s] on a set of ideas that do 
not take religion seriously as a form of human endeavor."15 He sug-
gests that modern puzzlement anq "disarray" over the religion clauses 
arises because the clauses are founded on premises of the absent repub-
lican tradition, 16 and cannot be sufficiently explained or accommo-
dated in a liberal world. "[C]onstitutionalists in.the liberal tradition," 
he argues, "are committed to developing a law of religion even though 
13. American Booksellers Assn. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 329 (7th Cir. 1985), affd., 475 U.S. 
1001 (1986). 
14. See pp. 306-09. 
15. P. 257. See generally pp. 249-69. 
16. The implication that Madison, the primary congressional drafter and advocate of the Bill 
of Rights, was a republican, is inaccurate but probably unintended. It was originally the Antifed-
eralist opponents of the Constitution who urged the adoption of the Bill of Rights (including the 
religion clauses), and many historians have associated the Antifederalists with "Country" or 
republican tenets. See, e.g.. L. BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION: EVOLUTION OF A 
PARTY IDEOLOGY 92-272 (1978); Hutson, Country, Court, and Constitution: Anti.federalism and 
the Constitution, 38 WM. & MARY Q. 337 (1981); Wren, The Ideology of Court and Country in 
the Virginia Ratifying Convention of 1788, 93 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOG. 389 (1985). Moreover, 
the religion clauses derive from earlier documents - most notably the Virginia Declaration of 
Rights of 1776 - and republican sentiment was widespread during the 1770s. See, e.g., Sherry, 
The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution: A Lawyers' Guide to Contemporary Historical Schol-
arship, 5 CONST. COMMENTARY 323 (1988). Finally, some historians do identify Madison with 
the republican tradition. See G. WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST (1981); Sun-
stein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985). 
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they do not understand why they have to do so" (p. 248). Both his 
doctrinal analysis and his historical and philosophical explanations 
seem indisputably accurate. 
It is troubling, however, that religion seems to be one of the few 
issues on which Tushnet criticizes the liberal tradition only for its fail-
ure to live up to its own commitment. He argues that liberalism's 
historical commitment to religion as a worthwhile civic endeavor is 
unintelligible in a post-republican world, but he never suggests that 
the commitment is misplaced. In other words, he, like a growing 
number of left-leaning scholars, seems to believe that religion can and 
should play a significant role in public life. 17 He bemoans the Ameri-
can "civil religion" because it prevents us from "deriv[ing] policy posi-
tions from religion" (p. 269); he derogates the Court's implication that 
"religion is not in itself terribly important" (p. 268); and he criticizes 
the effect of the post-republican liberal tradition for denying religion 
any "distinctive role to play in the shaping of public policy" (p. 272). 
In a decade in which the religious right has made unprecedented polit-
ical gains-often at the expense of individual liberty and equality18 -
it seems odd for a self-proclaimed leftist to advocate giving religion a 
more prominent role in public policymaking. 
Tushnet's arguments, moreover, tend to undermine his general 
criticism of the liberal privileging of rationality. If he wants to con-
vince readers that rationality should be replaced or supplemented by 
noncognitive capacities, the noncognitive deliberative process should 
be described in a sympathetic manner. Defining noncognitive appeals 
by reference to rhetoric or art, for example, is a persuasive illustration 
that an exclusive focus on rationality is misplaced. Tushnet's own de-
scription of the intuitive faculty of practical reason is promising: "[It] 
is not exercised by deductive reasoning from premises or by clearly 
articulated analogical reasoning from similar circumstances; it is exer-
cised more directly, by responding to situations without the interven-
tion of those modes of reason we now call logical or analytical."19 But 
17. See, e.g., Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby, 1987 
DUKE L.J. 977; Peller, Creation, Evolution, and the New South, TIKKUN, Nov.-Dec. 1987, at 72. 
18. See, e.g., D.C. Appropriations Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-462, sec. 145, 1989 U.S. 
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 2269-14 ("Nation's Capital Religious Liberty and 
Academic Freedom Act") (federal statute requiring D.C. City Council to exempt religious edu-
cational organizations from anti-discrimination provisions). This statute was successfully chal-
lenged in Clark v. United States, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15, GI 1, 5 (D.D.C.) (holding that 
conditioning the city's funding on the Council's amending the D.C. Human Rights Act violates 
council members' freedom of speech). See also Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988) (up-
holding federal statute funding "family planning" counseling by religious organizations). See 
generally WHOSE VALUES? THE BATILE FOR MORALITY IN PLURALISTIC AMERICA (L. Hom 
ed. 1985) (fundamentalist Christian blueprint for reforming American society). 
19. P. 161. For similarly sympathetic renderings of the importance ofnoncognitive faculties, 
see Farber, From Plastic Trees to Arrow's Theorem, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 337; Gewirtz, Aeschy-
lus' Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1043 (1988); Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 835 
(1987). 
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such things as divine revelation and biblical literalism are irrational 
superstitious nonsense; if that is what Tushnet means by noncognitive 
capacities, then I - and probably many other readers - would en-
courage the liberal tradition of excluding nonrational modes of 
discourse. 
This particular problem aside, Tushnet's doctrmal analysis and cri-
tique is intriguing but unsatisfying. His depiction of the Supreme 
Court's liberal vision in which rationality is the primary hunian mode 
of deliberation is plausible, but it does not take us very far. He does 
not describe how noncognitive modes of deliberation might work or 
what results they might reach, or even give eVidence that such 
noncognitive processes play an important role in individuals' public or 
political decisions. These chapters thus have a strong nihilist streak, 
in that they deconstruct liberal rationality without even sketching a 
replacement (other than religious conviction, apparendy). It is partic-
ularly unseemly for a legal academic to deprecate rational thinking, 
for rationality is at the heart of legal analysis and· discourse - includ-
ing the analysis in Red, White, and Blue. · · · 
Complementing the nihilistic cast ofTushnet's theory, his practical 
discussions are concrete but unrealistic. There are two difficulties with 
his practical framework, both of which suggest an ivory-tower 
isolation. 
First, the problems he chooses to focus on are not the pressing 
societal issues of discrimination, poverty, education, or abortion. In-
stead, he dallies with procedural due process, which by his own admis-
sion cannot address the real problems of so~iety, but only redistributes 
wealth "from the abysmally poor to the merely poor" (p. 246). He 
criticizes the liberal handling of religion, despite the fact that current 
doctrine regularly if uneasily protects dissident religions while denying 
them the power to impose their views on others.20 His discussion of 
free speech is confined to the harmless doctrine of commercial speech, 
the hopeless problem of campaign reform, and the radical. feminist ob-
session with pornography. Insofar as Tushnet reflects CLS views in 
his failure to admit the real gains that liberalism (and its theory of 
rights) have afforded minorities and women and his refusal to address 
the issues most important to them, it is not surprising that CLS main-
tains only a stormy and uneasy alliance with minority and women's 
groups.21 
20. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); 
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 479 (1987); but see Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). Both of the latter cases primarily involve the role of a 
Jewish minority in a predominantly Christian country, while the other cases involve less visible 
and less threatening religions such as the Amish and fundamentalist Christians. 
21. See, e.g., FEMINISM AS CRmQUE: ON THE PoLmcs OF GENDER (S. Benhabib & D. 
Cornell eds. 1987); Minority Critiques of the Critical Legal Studies Movement (Symposium), 22 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. REv. 297 (1987); Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transforma-
tion and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331 (1988); Menke!-
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Finally, his proposed remedies - his attempts to re-inject the 
"real" world - are stunningly (and concededly) utopian. He wants to 
give students or their parents an absolute veto power over suspensions 
and to establish neighborhood patrols to replace police (pp. 244-45). 
He would explore "a comprehensive income maintenance scheme that 
would redistribute wealth in a way that would permanently eradicate 
large disparities between the rich and the poor" (p. 246). He suggests 
that a policy of "mutual forbearance" would diminish religious strife: 
schools might have "deliberated seriously about the religious conten-
tion [their] use of the prayer caused and might have forgone - as a 
matter of discretion not of constitutional command [sic] - the use of 
the prayer," while "those offended by the prayer might have exercised 
a wise discretion to forgo the constitutional challenge they were in a 
strict sense entitled to bring" (p. 276). 
These suggestions echo - whether intentionally or not - his basic 
critical point from Part One: if we need rules to constrain discretion, 
we will not be able to find any that do so successfully, and if we are 
able to find such rules, then we do not need them. That leaves us with 
only the critical project. 
II 
It is, then, Tushnet's commitment to pure critique that makes the 
book less than satisfying. And· it is his occasional betrayal of that 
commitment that offers the best ·opportunity for the reader to learn 
from the book. 
Tushnet shows that each grand theory requires an underlying the-
ory of community in order to constrain successfully the discretion of 
both judges and legislators; each constitutional doctrine also needs a 
theory of community if it is to be plausible and coherent.22 But a the-
ory of community, inherent in the framers' original amalgamation of 
the liberal and republican traditions, has been irretrievably lost with 
the decline of republicanism: · "[O]ur communities have shattered 
around us" (p. 143). Moreover, if we did have an active republican 
tradition and viable community norms, then we would not need judi-
cial review: The political branches would act in the interest of the 
community (pp. 59, 167). Having provided us with these insights, 
Tushnet himself explicitly refuses to carry forward the project: he 
concludes only that constitutional theory is impossible where it is nec-
essary and unnecessary where it is possible. 
Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and Legal Education or "The Fem-Crits 
Go to Law School." 38 J. LEGAL Eouc. 61 (1988); West, Deconstructing the CLS-FEM Split, 2 
WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 85 (1986). 
22. For example, originalism depends on a continuity between past and present communities, 
and neutral principles on a community of interpreters. Pp. 22, 46, 57. Only a theocy of commu-
nity-formed values, and of communities intermediacy between the individual and the state, 
makes logical and historical sense of the religion clauses. Pp. 269-76. 
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What makes Red, White, and Blue an ultimately hopeful and help-
ful book is Tushnet's patent longing for. the republican revival he de-
nies can occur or endure. His denial of the transformative power of 
the republican vision is forthright. He views humans as inevitably and 
hopelessly conflicted by the fundamental contradiction between con-
nection and autonomy. There is thus no possibility of either a liberal 
or a republican solution to the fundamental dilemmas of our society, 
but only a critique of both. His adherence to the purely critical stance 
is explicit, and his refusal to admit the possibility of successful consti-
tutional reform frequent. He begins and ends by stating that no con-
temporary reconciliation between the liberal and republican traditions 
is possible.23 Throughout these essays, he points to the rejection of 
Aristotelianism, the rise of egalitarian norms, and the concentration of 
wealth (pp. 161-62 & n.54; 59, 166, 315) to conclude that "the liberal 
tradition has so eroded republicanism that it is difficult to believe that 
the products of today's legislatures could actually revitalize republi-
canism" (p. 279). 
But despite this :flood of denials, Tushnet again and again shows us 
ways in which republican notions of community pervade our modem 
liberal world. His chapter on religion demonstrates that "the Consti-
tution is not an entirely individualist document," but instead contains 
"communitarian commitment~ [in] the form of an implicit appeal to a 
tradition of civic republicanism" (p. 274). He sketches the direction 
that future scholarship might take Jo make explicit a republican con-
stitutionalism: it might "offer a definition of citizenship consistent 
with the idea of a commonwealth," it might "discuss the social pre-
conditions for ethical 'knowledge," or it might redefine principles of 
federalism based on existing "intentional communities" rather than 
geographic accidents (pp. 314-16). 
Tushnet appears to be deliberately directing other scholars to ave-
nues that Red, White, and Blue implicitly deems futile, perhaps in the 
hope that he is wrong. He is thus engaging in a tradition of dialogue 
that vies with radical criticism for pride of place in his own description 
of appropriate modes of constitutional scholarship.24 The purpose of 
the dialogue is also clear: "The task of constitutional theory ought no 
23. See pp. 23 & 318: 
It may be that we live in a world of tension, in which no unified social theory but only a 
dialogue between the traditions is possible. Constitutional theory is then either impossible or 
unnecessary. 
Neither the liberal tradition nor the republican one can accommodate the aspects of 
experience that the other takes as central. 
24. See, e.g., p. 23 (suggesting that only dialogue between traditions is possible); pp. 58-59 
(discussing prerequisites for dialogue); pp. 149-53 (praising Robert Burt's notion of dialogue as a 
method of creating community); pp. 287-88 (suggesting that republican tradition encourages par-
ticipation in public debate or dialogue); p. 302 (implying that "utopian" literature, while unreal-
istic, can still initiate a dialogue); p. 316 (suggesting that "face-to-face" dialogue might make 
dispute resolution easier). 
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longer be to rationalize the real in one way or another. It should be to 
contribute to a political movement that may begin to bring about a 
society in which civic virtue may flourish" (p. 187). 
Additionally, Tushnet encourages a contemporary version of re-
publicanism by demanding that we knowingly and deliberately consti-
tute our communities. He states that a vision of community is 
"pernicious because it imagines that community now exists," but it is 
also "inspiring because it tells us that even if community does not now 
exist, we can begin to create it. We need not await the revolution that 
will transform society, for by acting on our vision of community we 
make society different" (p. 145). He suggests that the hermeneutic 
tradition is valuable because it forces us to think about which past is 
"our" past, and thus "to face questions about what kind of community 
we have and want" (p. 44). Thus despite his denial that a republican 
community is possible in a liberal world, he urges us to disregard his 
pessimism and to forge ahead to create communities. 
Ironically, Tushnet's most adamant rejections of the transforma-
tive power of a theory of community offer the strongest support for a 
republican revival in constitutional law. His refutation of community 
values theories, practical reason, and "little theory" (essentially an 
amalgamation of the best parts of each of the grand theories) contains 
the heart of his argument, although specific examples are also scat-
tered throughout the book. 
The primary problem with all three of these theories, according to 
Tushnet, is that they assume an interpretive community, or "commu-
nity of understanding," that does not exist. Whether judges are told to 
use practical reason, or to discover the underlying values of the com-
munity, or to choose among the various grand theories depending on 
the particular constitutional clause at issue ("little theory"), they will 
essentially be limited by nothing other than their own values. Tushnet 
denies that judges' value8 can ever truly reflect the community's 
values: 
Attaching the general possessive our to the word community makes a 
false claim of fact. At most judges can interpret "their" community's 
values. That immediately directs our attention to who they are. Indeed, 
who they are and how they are selected are aspects of our legal culture 
that themselves deserve interpretation. [p. 144; footnote omitted] 
Thus there is no community of interpretation that includes both 
judges and citizens. 
Indeed, the larger implication ofTushnet's argument here seems to 
be that "we" cannot have any cohesive community large enough to 
encompass the entire citizenry, because there is insufficient homogene-
ity or consensus. Here and there he hints that some revitalized form 
of federalism, relying on communities smaller than the entire nation, 
might solve this dilemma (pp. 106-07, 272-73, 315). In general, how-
ever, he argues that we have no community that is "ours," and that if 
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we did we would need neither judicial review nor constitutional 
theory. 
Tushnet's pessimistic assessment overlooks two ways in which a 
theory of community might be both possible and useful. First, he is 
too quick to reject the communities of interpretation that do exist. 
For example, he suggests that it is possible to generate and justify a 
virtually unlimited number of correct answers to questions such as 
"Which pair of numbers comes next in the series 1, 3, 5, 7 ... ?" on an 
IQ test and "What is responsible for most automobile accidents?" on a 
driver's license test (pp. 55-56). He admits, however, that anyone tak-
ing the IQ test is likely to prefer "9, 11" to "Cleveland, Newark," and 
anyone taking the drivers' test is likely to choose "the driver" over 
"the car." His explanation is that "we know something about the rule 
to follow [in selecting a multiple choice answer] only because we are 
familiar with the social practices of intelligence testing and drivers' 
education" (p. 56). But this admission constitutes a recognition that a 
community of interpretation does exist, and it is a community over 
which there is very little controversy. Insignificant as that community 
of understanding may be, it provides a beginning. 
Tushnet's use of bizarre multiple choices answers reminds me of 
the (probably apocryphal) story of the physics student who was asked 
on an examination how to use a barometer to determine the height of a 
building. He refused to give the "correct" answer, and instead sug-
gested numerous equally useful - and equally learned - alternatives: 
measure the shadows cast -by the barometer and the building and cal-
culate the unknown height of the building from the known height of 
the barometer; drop the barometer off the roof, time its fall, and calcu-
late the height according to the -formula for acceleration; or, most in-
geniously, bribe the building superintendent to provide the height of 
the building by offering her the barometer. 25 
What makes the story clever is that every reader is a member of 
the community that is "familiar with the social practices" of both ba-
rometers and physics examinations. Occasional instances of nonmem-
bership - whether deliberate (as is likely in the student's case) or not 
- do not undermine the existence of widespread communities. While 
it may be unfair to penalize the defiant student, even Tushnet would 
have difficulty denying credit to any student who explained how to 
calculate altitude from air pressure differences. And if the defiant stu-
dent were in a position to determine which answer was "correct" for 
the whole class, almost everyone would agree that it would be some-
how wrong for him to select one of his own answers over the air pres-
sure answer. 
The fact that there are many answers, and that in some other social 
25. The way I have heard the story told (by critics of modern academia), the student failed 
the examination. 
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milieu (a Mensa meeting, for example) a more unusual answer would 
be thought most "correct," does not undermine our essential under-
standing that only one answer can be imposed on the community of 
physics students. The same may be said of judicial imposition of con-
stitutional norms. 
It is not difficult, for example, to elicit widespread - but not unan-
imous - agreement that, for example, Brown v. Board of Education 26 
should not be reversed, a federal statute naming Christianity the offi-
cial American religion would be unconstitutional, and the Supreme 
Court cannot take jurisdiction to decide a wager between two law 
professors about whether some proposed statute is constitutional.27 
Despite the occasional dissenter, a national community of understand-
ing exists on these questions, and any Supreme Court decision to the 
contrary would be subject to the same massive criticism as the defiant 
student's selection of the acceleration answer as the only correct an-
swer for the class.28 Tushnet might respond that the Court's adher-
ence to a widespread understanding illustrates his points that judicial 
review doesn't matter, and that a theory of constraints is unnecessary 
wherever it is possible. That argument, however, ignores the differ-
ence between unanimity and consensus: There are still racist school 
boards in a nation that generally finds racism intolerable, fundamen-
talist legislators in a nation that rejects a national religion, and so on. 
Dissenters from even a widespread community of understanding will 
wreak havoc if they are not restrained; that is one of the purposes of 
judicial review. Indeed, the public outcry at positions taken by Robert 
Bork suggests a fairly broad - but far from unanimous - consensus 
on some issues that were previously thought controversial. 
Where does this get us? It does not demonstrate that there is only 
a single answer to society's most difficult constitutional dilemmas - it 
certainly doesn't tell us whether Roe v. Wade is correct, for example 
- nor even provide us with any grand theory to guide future constitu-
tional interpretation. It does suggest that there are, as Fred Schauer 
has described, "easy cases," and wrong answers.29 From there we can 
move forward. 
This leads to my second disagreement with Tushnet's total rejec-
tion of community. Once we have demonstrated that there are com-
26. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
27. But see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 74344 (1982); cf H. FINK & M. TUSHNET, 
FEDERAL JURISDICTION 322 (2d ed. 1987) (suggesting that Nixon v. Fitzgerald did essentially 
decide a wager). 
28. There is, of course, still the question of the doctrinal consequences of widespread consen· 
sus. The Supreme Court might ignore the consensus (as it did between 1930 and 1937). That 
would not undermine the basic thrust of my argument: that there are communities of under· 
standing and that they can, if adhered to, constrain judicial action. Certainly the Supreme Court 
can do whatever it likes, but truly unconstrained acts will simply result in a constitutional crisis 
(as in 1937). 
29. Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985). 
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munities of understanding, we can begin to construct a theory of the 
Constitution that recognizes and fosters such communities. Tushnet 
dismisses, I think properly, the likelihood that decisions by today's 
judges will create the preconditions for a general republican revival 
(pp. 165-67). But a more limited goal may be achievable: to create a 
broader and deeper community of understanding. 30 
We might begin by demanding that constitutional decisions always 
foster rather than undermine a nationwide community of understand-
ing. Where two results would have equal effect on the inclusiveness or 
stability of the national community, judges should attempt to foster 
smaller communities as well. We are, as Tushnet reminds us, ·consti-
tuted by our communities. Membership in intermediary communities 
is both inevitable and important to self-understanding, while member-
ship in a broader community of understanding is a substitute for force 
in preventing internecine warfare among the smaller communities, and 
our only hope for national unity.31 A constitutional command that 
required judges to consider what impact their decisions would have on 
both types of communities would at least be a beginning. In several 
areas, moreover, a normative constitutional standard that sought to 
expand the inclusiveness of the community might have an observable 
positive effect on constitutional doctrine. 
Justice O'Connor has essentially adopted such a standard in her 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause. She eschews the standard 
three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 32 and instead suggests that the 
test should be "whether government's purpose is to endorse religion 
and whether the statute actually conveys a message of endorse-
ment."33 Significantly, she bases this test on the need to create as 
broad a community as possible: "Endorsement sends a message to 
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political 
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are 
insiders, favored members of the political community. Disapproval 
sends the opposite message."34 Thus O'Connor finds in the Establish-
30. Tushnet touches briefly on this goal. If I understand him correctly; he argues both that 
this is impossible, and that if it were possible, we would not need judicial review. Pp. 58-59. His 
analysis is flawed by his overly narrow suggestion of the "pre-requisites" for a community of 
understanding: either "substantial equality of power and of access to material resources" or 
"confrontations with scarcity or similar natural kinds of experiences." P. 59. If those are in fact 
necessary prerequisites, he is probably correct that a community of understanding is impossible. 
I argue in the text, however, that there are other ways to achieve a community of understanding 
(and to accommodate nonmembers). 
31. See generally Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. 
L. REV. 303 (1986). 
32. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
33. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862, 2874 (1987) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring), quoting Wallace v. Jatfree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring). 
34. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also Wal-
lace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring): "[T]he religious liberty protected by 
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ment Clause a republican desire to minimize religious strife by encour-
aging political inclusion. 
Education is another area where the republican tradition's focus 
on community might afford a guide to decisions. Amy Gutmann has 
pointed out that a democratic society is "a society whose adult mem-
bers are, and continue to be, equipped by their education and author-
ized by political structures to share in ruling."35 But participation in 
governance necessarily requires that one be a member of a shared 
community of understanding. Thus one can argue that educational 
structures must be such that they prepare children to become mem-
bers of both the national community and smaller communities. As 
Gutmann puts it: 
Democratic citizens are persons partially constituted by subcommunities 
(such as their family, their work, play, civic, and religious groups), yet 
free to choose a way of life compatible with their larger communal iden-
tity ... because the larger community has equipped them for deliberat-
ing and thereby participating in the democratic processes by which 
choice among good lives and the chance to pursue them are politically 
structured. 36 
As Gutmann suggests, the prerequisites for participation in the demo-
cratic polity - or, in our terms, membership in the community of 
understanding - include both a critical deliberative faculty and an 
understanding of and predisposition toward life in our democratic so-
ciety. The latter of these prerequisites parallels what Tushnet finds 
"attractive" about the appeal to community values: such an appeal 
"implicitly assumes ... that [community] values should be historically 
grounded in the experience of actual communities" (p. 145). 
Since "our" community is an extremely heterogenous society, one 
of the values that must be inculcated is tolerance of differehce.37 This 
value also reinforces the notion of an inclusive community: to the ex-
tent that dissidents and outsiders are sincerely tolerated, they are wel-
comed into the community. Ahd yet tolerance, accompanied by both 
a commitment to developing the critical faculty and an ultimate goal 
of creating a wider commµnity of under.standing, is not equivalent ~o 
moral (or educational) relativism. Those without understanding 
should .be welcomed, but they should not be left in ignorance. To take 
one controversial example, non-English-speaking children should not 
be deprived of educational opportunities, but they should be required 
to learn English rather than being taught solely in their native Ian-
the Establishment Clause is infringed when the government makes adherence to religion relevant 
to a person's standing in the political community." For a discussion of how O'Connor's jurispru-
dence sometimes reflects a republican vision, see Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in 
Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543 (1986). 
35. A. GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION xi (1987). 
36. Id. at 45-46. 
37. See generally L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (1986). 
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guage. Otherwise, they will never share in some aspects of a national 
community of understanding. 
A very brief survey of some important Supreme Court decisions on 
education may illuminate some of the practical consequences of such a 
scheme. Different subcommunities may approach the prerequisites in 
different ways, and indeed it would send a message of exclusion to 
deny them that right. Thus parents should be permitted to enroll their 
children in schools that both approach education differently and 
preach the tenets of some smaller community. Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, 38 denying the state the right to demand feaJty to its own educa-
tion system, was therefore correctly decided. To the extent that a 
subcommunity's unique approach to education and community de-
prives its children of the future ability to participate in the national 
community of understanding, however, the subcommunity is under-
mining the primary goal of encouraging membership in that commu-
nity. Thus Wisconsin v. Yoder 39 was wrongly decided, because it 
allows the Amish to deprive their children of the knowledge and abil-
ity necessary to any future choice between the Amish community and 
the larger community.40 Edwards v. Aguillard, 41 by contrast, is right: 
not only does requiring the teaching of creationism send a message of 
exclusion to non-fundamentalists, it also - even if enacted by a com-
munity with no dissenters - stifles children's critical faculty by teach-
ing authoritarian dogma rather' than the scientific technique of 
constant questioning.42 
Finally, educational policies should not be permitted to deprive 
some children of adequate opportunity to acquire the prerequisites for 
membership in our community of understanding. Some cases are 
therefore truly easy, although they may be difficult to explain by 
means of any grand theory: Brown v. Board of Education 43 and Plyler 
v. Doe44 must be right, but San Antonio Jndep. School Dist. v. Rodri-
guez45 ca:imot be.46 . 
38. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
39. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
40. Similarly, although M~yer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), correctly invalidated a stat-
ute prohibiting the teaching of foreign langnages to young children, a state could validly prohibit 
elementary schools from instructing children solely in their native language, and failing to teach 
English at all. 262 U.S. at 402., 
41. 482 U.S. 479 (1981). ' 
42. See Sherry, Republican Citizenship in a Democratic Society (Book Review), 66 TEXAS L. 
REV. 1229, 1238-39 (1988); see also M. PERRY, MORALITY, PoLmCS, AND LAW 20, 30, 138-39 
(1988); West, The Authoritarian Impulse In Constitutional Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 531 
(1988). Invalidating a ~reationist statute sends a message, not of exclusion but of inclusion: it 
tells fundamentalists that they cannot totally secede from the larger community. 
43. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
44. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
45. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
46. Tushnet would undoubtedly respond that my list mirrors some Democratic.Party plat-
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There are, of course, many harder cases. Is community fostered or 
undermined - is critical ability developed or stifled - by some cen-
sorship of school newspapers? Does searching school lockers without 
a warrant tum students into outsiders or teach the wrong lesson about 
how authority should work in America, or is it a valid way of teaching 
the consequences of irresponsibility? Perhaps most difficult is the 
question of affirmative action in education: does the deliberate and 
explicit creation of a more diverse educational community promote 
both greater tolerance among the dominant community and broader 
membership among the previously excluded minority, or does it 
merely foster resentment and greater intolerance against the minority? 
Whatever the empirical answer to this last question, there might also 
be a difference between affirmative action designed to provide role 
models for students, 47 and affirmative action designed to provide eco-
nomic opportunities for adults48 and the difference might not cut in 
the direction the Supreme Court has indicated. 
These examples should make clear that the notion that constitu-
tional decisions should foster community - at the national level first 
and at a local level only where it does not undermine a national com-
munity of understanding-is not a "ITTand theory." It does not make 
constitutional decisions mechanical, nor is it intended to constrain ju-
dicial discretion. At best, it is a contribution to what Tushnet calls 
"little theory." It is an approach that attempts to combine a variety of 
attractive and persuasive notions into a flexible standard that guides 
and directs but does not control. It is also an aspirational approach: 
to the extent that.we treat law (especially constitutional law) as capa-
ble of creating community, it will move in that direction.49 
Tushnet criticizes "little theory" partly on the ground that it re-
quires (but lacks) a meta-theory to determine which sort of theory to 
form, although I doubt that most political liberals would agree that Yoder was incorrectly de-
cided. But see Douglas' dissent in Yoder. 406 U.S. at 241-49 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Moreover, 
to the extent that education should turn children into "native speakers" of American culture, I 
would support both Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979), and assimilationist goals; both are 
generally in disrepute in the left-liberal academy. 
Finally, I believe that the general liberal acclaim for Stanford's decision to alter unrecogniz-
ably the "Western Culture" course is misplaced: While a (perhaps required) course on subcom-
munities and their cultures would be a worthwhile addition to the curriculum, the "Western 
Culture" course itself was also a vital educational tool for creating a nationally shared commu-
nity of understanding. Abandoning it - especially for the popularly perceived reason of pres-
sure from subcommunities - will simply hasten and reaffirm the fragmentation of whatever 
national community of understanding exists. See White, ls Cultural Criticism Possible?, 84 
MICH. L. REv. 1373, 1382-83 (1986). Moreover, as a practical matter, a failure to educate stu-
dents in Western culture is likely to lead to further incoherence rather than to beneficial transfor-
mations; as every good lawyer knows, you must understand your opponent's argument in order 
to refute it. A citizen who has read neither Locke nor Aristotle is in a poor position to choose 
between their visions. 
47. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
48. See Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
49. See Nelson, Second Reply to Robert Gordon, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 184, 185 (1988). 
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apply in a given case. More fundamentally, he argues that, like all 
constitutional theory, it insufficiently restrains both judges and 
legislatures: 
I propose the following test: determine the best and worst politically 
feasible outcomes you can imagine from legislatures in the ten years fol-
lowing the time that you are applying the test. An approach to constitu-
tional law ... is indefensible if it would allow judges to uphold the worst 
and invalidate the best politically feasible programs that legislatures are 
likely to devise in the near future. [p. 186] 
Tushnet's vision of judges seems to be one of caged animals waiting to 
escape and' wreak havoc. Absolute constraints are therefore vital. 
If one views judges as human beings, steeped in American legal 
culture and all its biases but trying nevertheless to do justice, 
Tushnet's demand for perfection seems less urgent. I would therefore 
suggest an alternative test for judging the success of judicial review. 
Take any case you agree with and ask whether it would have been 
decided the same way fifty or a hundred years earlier. Constitutional 
law, with or without constitutional theory, is far from perfect, but it 
works and it is making progress. so 
Tushnet's unremitting attack on judicial review is much like the 
quip about the economist who saw something that worked in practice 
and asked whether it could work in theory. The most basic problem 
with Tushnet's critical stance is that by denying that the current hap-
hazard (but functional, if sometimes misguided) system of judicial re-
view can work, he is leaving it open to attack from either the left or 
the right. And it is dangerously utopian to assume that if one destroys 
the status quo it will be replaced by the political agenda of the left 
rather than of the right. 
50. This is not to suggest that I subscribe to the Whiggish historical model of judging the 
past through the lens of the present. See M. Tushnet, The American Law of Slavery, 1810-1860: 
A Study in the Persistence of Legal Autonomy, 10 LAW & Soc'Y. REv. 119, 176 (1975) (sug-
gesting that characterizing past judicial actors in modem political terms is misguided); Nash, 
Reason of Slavery: Understanding the Judicial Role in the Peculiar Institution, 32 V AND. L. REV. 
7, 30-32 (1979) (describing and criticizing wµig historiography). It is only to suggest that some 
of the substantive goals that Tushnet and I share can be, and have been, accomplished through 
judicial review in the face of legislative obduracy. Moreover, the judicial ability to wreak havoc 
- by invalidating "good" statutes - has, by and large, not been realized. See, e.g., Mistretta v. 
United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989) (upholding Sentencing Guidelines); Morrison v. Olson, 108 
S. Ct. 2597 (1988) (upholding Independent Counsel Act); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 108 S. Ct. 
849 (1988) (upholding rent control ordinance). But see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 
(1905) (invalidating maximum work hours legislation); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 
How.) 393 (1857). 
